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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the tournament hypothesis in the UK mutual
fund market. Based on a previous US study, fund managers were expected to alter risk-taking
behaviour in response to their performance relative to competing fund managers.
Design/methodology/approach – Based on an earlier methodology, contingency tables were used
to examine the risk-taking behaviour of fund managers after an interim performance period. The
sample consists of 422 UK equity mutual funds with monthly data from 1989 to 2003. To avoid
survivorship bias, funds that did not survive the entire sample period were also included. This leads
to a total of 3,617 observations.
Findings – The main conclusions are two-fold. First, using the entire 1989-2003 sample period no
consistent evidence for tournament behaviour is found. This is robust to the effects of survivorship
bias and window dressing. Second, splitting the sample period into two sub-periods reveals an
interesting pattern. During the first part of the sample period, 1989-1996, significant evidence for
tournament behaviour is found. During the second part of the sample period, 1997-2003, significant
support for strategic behaviour, as described theoretically by Taylor has been documented.
Research limitations/implications – The results suggest that after 1996, managers entered into a
strategic game that takes the actions of competing managers into account instead of seeing them as
exogenous benchmarks.
Originality/value – By studying the UK fund market, the US results can be tested to see if they are
sample specific or can be carried over to other countries as well. Furthermore, the sample period
includes data after 1996, the year of the first publication on the tournament hypothesis. This enabled
investigation in to whether managers adapted their strategies.
Keywords Unit trusts, Management strategy, Game theory, United Kingdom
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Recently the risk-taking behaviour of mutual fund managers in response to their
relative performance has been scrutinized by a growing number of academic studies.
Most notably Brown et al. (1996) documented a hitherto undiscovered game performed
by US mutual fund managers. Using a sample of monthly returns for 334 growth-
oriented US mutual funds during 1980-1991 they find that relative mid-year losers
increase portfolio risk more than relative mid-year winners. That is, managers who
trail the market in the first-half of the year increase risk to catch up with the market,
while managers who are ahead of the market lock in their winner status. This is
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commonly referred to as the tournament hypothesis. The rationale for this can be
found in Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and
Tufano (1998). These papers indicate that funds earning the highest returns during an
assessment period (usually a calendar year) subsequently receive the largest new
inflows of money in the fund. Funds with the lowest returns however do not
significantly shrink in size. Due to this asymmetric flow of new money loser funds
clearly have an incentive to increase risk as a subsequent failure does not lead to
significant outflows. As fund managers typically are compensated based on a
percentage of the assets under management, all ingredients for managerial
manipulation offund risk are therefore present.
Contradicting evidence is presented in Busse (2001). Using daily data for 230 US
funds from 1985 to 1995, he finds that funds that are ranked above the median fund
increase risk more than below median funds. This is interpreted as evidence against
the tournament hypothesis described in Brown et al. (1996). Similar results are
documented by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) who find that winner funds have a larger
incentiveto increase risk.
Taylor (2003) attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradicting results by
introducing a formal two-period tournament model. All previous studies assume
managers treat competing managers as exogenous benchmarks. Taylor (2003) extends
this reasoning and allows for the fact that managers also take the actions of other
managers into account. The model is therefore based on strategic interaction between
active fund managers. In this game, the winner expects the loser to increase risk (based
on tournament hypothesis) and therefore the winner also increases risk to maintain the
lead. Taylor (2003) shows that in equilibrium the winner is more likely to increase risk
than the loser. Therefore, previous results that were first interpreted as evidence
against tournament hypothesis might well be explained as strategic behaviour
instead[1].
Recently Goriaev et al. (2001, 2005) note two potential biases that could influence all
previous work, being first-order autocorrelation and the assumption that mutual fund
returns are cross-sectionally independent. The authors find that tests of tournament
hypothesis using monthly data is more robust to autocorrelation than tests using daily
data. Furthermore, they show that cross-correlated fund returns do not necessarily
invalidate the tournament tests used before. The idiosyncratic fund returns in a factor
model should however be uncorrelated.
All previously cited work in this area has exclusively focused on the US mutual
fund market [2]. It might be that these results however are sample specific and pertain
to the structure of the very competitive US market. To investigate this possibility we
investigate the UK mutual fund market, which also has a long history of fund
research[3]. However, to our best knowledge no work on tournaments for the UK
mutual fund industry has been produced.
Our contribution therefore is that we examine the fund tournament for a hitherto
unexamined highly developed fund market. This is done using a survivorship bias
controlled database of 422 UK mutual funds for the 1989-2003 period. This period is
particularly interesting as it allows us to examine the period after the Brown et al.
(1996) study was published. Next to that we address the recent criticism on previous
studies put forward by for instance Goriaev et al. (2001, 2005). Specifically we use
monthly returns to diminish autocorrelation and we use funds with different types of
investmentstrategy to controlforcross-correlated fund returns.MF
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the
methodology used in fund tournament studies. Section 3 describes our dataset. In
section4, we presentthe empirical results.Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Methodology
The methodology we employ in this paper is largely taken from Brown et al. (1996).
The only important difference is the fact that we include funds with many different
types of investment styles, while Brown et al. (1996) only consider growth-oriented
funds. As funds within the same investment style exhibit higher cross-correlation of
fund returns, we mitigate the critique of Goriaev et al. (2001, 2005) by including funds
with differenttypesof investmentstrategies.
The general idea of tournament hypothesis in the mutual fund market deals with
the fact that fund managers will change the risk of a fund depending on its relative
performance compared to their peers. The mutual fund market could be seen as an
annual tournament inwhich the rival funds compete for the best performance by year-
end. If a fund manager lags behind in performance, tournament hypothesis predicts an
increase in risk relative to the group of winners, in an attempt to improve the
performanceby year-end.
If managers perceive the mutual fund market as a series of annual tournaments,
their behaviour should exhibit evidence of this. Especially in tandem with the battle for
capital inflow, a manager can feel the urge to alter the risk profile of a fund under
management in an attempt to increase the relative performance. Sirri and Tufano
(1998) show that winning managers will receive larger portions of capital inflow while
losing managers do not havetofear asubstantial capital outflow. This situation creates
the effect of a free call option. Winning managers on the other hand might be more
tempted to even lower the risk profile of the fund, to lock in the relative high returns
that are alreadyestablished.
The above breakdown leads to the following testable relationship between winning
and losing mutual funds. This risk adjustment ratio (RAR) measures the standard
deviation of the second period of the year, relative to the standard deviation of the first
period of the same year. The cut-off point can be taken at several points during the
year, but should at least include several months to be able to calculate a reliable
standard deviation. The RAR now determines whether the risk has increased from one









where 1 and 2 are the time periods, L denotes the interim ‘‘loser’’ and W denotes the
interim ‘‘winner’’. Tournament hypothesis predicts the RAR for the interim loser to be
larger than the RAR for the interim winner. The equation does not represent an exact
prediction, which will hold in all cases, but more a general tendency for the mutual
fund market as a whole. Nor does it say that risk always increases in the second period
forlosing managers. If overall risk profiles are decreasing, they will decrease in a lesser
extent for these losing managers. The adjustment to a different risk level depends on a
multitude of factors like the difference in performance relative to the peers and the
likely and anticipated reaction byother managers. However, in tournament hypothesis,
interim losers should in general have a larger RAR than the interim winners, no matter
whether this is increased, ordecreasedless.UK mutual fund
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Equation (1) states that the loser funds will increase portfolio risk to a larger degree
than that winner funds do after a certain mid-year point. To test for this, two variables
from the monthly mutual fund data are constructed. First, sub-groups of interim
winners and losers were constructed according to a fund’s relative return performance
between Januaryand month M. The M-month cumulative return (RTN) is calculated as
follows:
RTNjMy ¼½ ð 1 þ rj1yÞð1 þ rj2yÞ...ð1 þ rjMyÞ    1 ð2Þ
where j is a specific fund, y is a given year, rj is the monthly change in net asset value
and M is agivenmonth.
In the analysis, M is allowed to vary between April and August. This to detect
months in which the tournament might be more prominent. Once the RTN’s are
calculated for each yearly tournament, the funds are ranked from high to low. After
that, funds that performed above the median are labelled winner funds, and funds
performing below the median are loser funds. These classifications were made for
every different month M. In total, five months were under investigation so five RTN
rankings were developed for every year in the sample. Using the mean as the cut-off
point for winners and losers could increase the influence of possible outliers. The use of
the median ensures that exactly half of the sample will be labelled a loser or a winner,
giving two equal-sized samples to compare.
Second, a ratio of each funds’ volatility before and after the interim assessment




m¼Mþ1ðrjmy   rjð12 MÞyÞ
2=ðð12   MÞ 1Þ
PM
m¼1ðrjmy   rjMyÞ
2=ðM   1Þ
v u u t ð3Þ
In each yearly tournament, this RAR measures the standard deviation of a fund in the
latter part of a year, relative to the standard deviation of that fund before the interim
assessment date. This interim assessment date M can vary between April and August.
Following tournament hypothesis, the RAR is expected to be larger for loser funds
than forwinner funds.
Following Equations (2) and (3) pairs for every fund and every month M in each
yearly tournament are created. Each pair consists of the RTN measure for a certain
fund, linked to the RAR measure of that fund in the same month. A fund can belong to
one of the following four categories: (high RTN, high RAR), (high RTN, low RAR), (low
RTN, high RAR) and (low RTN, low RAR). The null hypothesis is that each of these
four categories would contain 25 per cent. The alternative hypothesis is that the (low
RTN, high RAR) and (high RTN, low RAR) groups would have significantly larger
frequencies than the other two cell outcomes. These four categories are placed in a
matrix to be able to investigate them empirically. 2 2 contingency tables were used
for the statistical part, with the statistical significance established with a  
2 test with
one degree of freedom. For every year of the 15-year sample, a matrix was created for
every month between April and August. The  
2 tests were performed on each of the
fivematrixes.
The months in which the hypothesis is not tested are not suitable for utilizable
conclusions. For instance, a test inwhich November would be the mid-year point wouldMF
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include a RAR calculation that is based on a standard deviation of a period with only
two data points.
3. Data
We use Datastream to create a comprehensive sample of UK open-end mutual funds
(unit trusts). Several restrictions on the total amount of available funds were put in
place to create a relevant dataset. We only include equity funds investing domestically,
therefore excluding mixed or internationally investingmutual funds.
The result is a monthly database starting January 1989 until December 2003
consisting of 422 UK mutual funds. We assume that the tournaments are held on an
annual basis, and that the funds are evaluated during the same cycle. Therefore, a fund
was only included if at least a full year of data was available, starting the first of
January. Funds that became active during a given year were included in next year’s
portfolio. A fund that ceased operations during a year was also removed from that
year’s portfolio under examination. Each year, the portfolios were reweighed to reflect
the most actual situation.
Particular attention was addressed to minimize the effects of survivorship bias.
As mentioned by Brown et al. (1996), the disappearance is more likely to affect
underperforming funds and therefore the results of the study would possibly
underestimate the tournament hypothesis. To account for survivorship bias,
information on dead funds was collected using the Financial Times UK Unit Trust
Yearbook 2003. The historical monthly data could then be retrieved from Datastream.
Again the constraint applied that the dead funds also had to have a full year of data
available to be included in the portfolio. In thisway, usable information on a total of115
dead fundswas obtained.
The entire sample consists of 3,191 living fund years, and 487 dead fund years,
totalling 3,678 mutual fund years. The sample also reflects the increase in mutual
funds on the UK market. In 1989, the first year of the sample, 142 funds are included.
This number has grown to 422 funds in 2003, an increase of more than 200 per cent.
Table I provides the relevant descriptivestatisticson oursample.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Full sample
To detect tournament behaviour for UK fund managers we first perform a general test
on our full sample. After that we establish a series of additional robustness checks to
test the sensitivity of our results to for instance survivorship bias, window dressing,
use of sub-samples, fund characteristics and the use of April as the ending point. All
tests have been conducted using a  
2 test. Given the format of 2 2 matrixes the
rejection region is based on one degree offreedom. The following values must therefore
be preserved to test for significance: a  
2 value of 3.84146 with   ¼0.05 and the
accompanying p-value of 0.05. Furthermore, it should be stressed that significant
outcomes do not necessarily imply tournament behaviour.
On the contrary, when the (high RTN, high RAR) or (low RTN, low RAR) cells
contain considerably more than 25 per cent of the data, evidence against tournament
hypothesis is present. This would be the strategic behaviour first discussed by Taylor
(2003).
Table II presents the most rudimentary test of the sample. All funds, including the
dead ones, are used during the full sample period to provide a first test of the
tournament hypothesis for UK mutual funds. At first sight, the results are ratherUK mutual fund
industry
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disappointing. Only one out of five cut-off months M provides cell frequencies that are
significantly different from our expectations under the null hypothesis. Funds with
returns above the median (interim winners) during January–May (M¼5) increase risk
more during the remaining part of the year than loser funds during the same period.
The difference is highly significant with a p-value of 0.006. This is evidence against the
tournament hypothesis and could indicate strategic behaviour by winner funds who
anticipate loser funds to increase risk as well. The most significant interim assessment




Year Number of funds Median return Median standard deviation
1989 142 19.94% 7.42%
1990 154  17.09 7.91
1991 157 10.55 6.54
1992 180 13.75 6.01
1993 182 24.41 8.87
1994 209  7.05 5.42
1995 221 17.02 7.46
1996 231 13.09 5.82
1997 239 17.65 8.29
1998 249 8.17 11.92
1999 257 20.45 11.74
2000 293  3.76 8.32
2001 326  14.91 12.96
2002 355  26.69 15.09
2003 422 18.22 10.69
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on our sample. Per year we report the number of









Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
(4,8) 3,617 24.25 25.55 25.55 24.66 1.728 0.189
(5,7) S 25.79 23.86 23.86 26.49 7.512 0.006
(6,6) 23.89 25.77 25.77 24.58 3.417 0.065
(7,5) 24.74 24.91 24.91 25.44 0.045 0.831
(8,4) 25.46 24.19 24.19 26.15 3.774 0.052
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the
assessment period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 12 M is the rest of the year. All data are constructed using 422 funds for the
1989-2003 sample period. Funds are divided into four groups on a yearly basis according to (i)
whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median and (ii) whether RAR is above
(‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a null hypothesis that each cell
should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample. Based on the results in the last
two columns we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament behaviour occurs for that period and an
‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These are reported in column 1MF
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Overall these first UK results do not corroborate the findings of Brown et al. (1996)
for US mutual funds. In the next paragraphs, we test the robustness of this preliminary
result.
4.2 Survivorship bias
Previous studies, such as Brown et al. (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) were
subject to survivorship bias. To make our results more comparable to the earlier work
we delete all dead funds from our full sample to create a surviving funds only sample.
As dead funds are usually clustered in the loser portfolio, Brown et al. (1996) would
suggest they are more susceptible to tournament behaviour. Leaving them out would
therefore underestimate tournament behaviour. Another view however is put forward
in Qiu (2003). There it is shown that survivorship bias might result in overestimating
the risk adjustment of losers. The results of applying the same methodology to our
survivorship biased sample can be found in Table III.
Adjusting our sample to surviving funds only does not change our results for any
given month M, even  
2 values hardly change. May remains the only significant
month, with evidence for strategic behaviour. Therefore we conclude that survivorship
bias does not seem to influence our results for UK mutual fund tournaments. All
subsequent tests aretherefore performed using the full sample, including dead funds.
4.3 Window dressing
There is convincing evidence that money managers exhibit window dressing
behaviour at the end of a calendar year. The typical situation is when a fund manager
sells stocks with poor previous performance and buying stocks that have performed
well. When seeing the year-end portfolio, loaded with well performing stocks, an
investor might stick with the fund even when performance has been poor. This is











Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
(4,8) 3,191 24.44 25.44 25.44 24.69 0.983 0.321
(5,7) S 25.79 23.85 23.85 26.51 6.757 0.009
(6,6) 23.79 25.85 25.85 24.51 3.735 0.053
(7,5) 24.73 24.91 24.91 25.45 0.037 0.848
(8,4) 25.35 24.29 24.29 26.07 2.586 0.108
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the RAR
and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the assessment
period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim assessment and
12 M is the rest of the year. All data are constructed using surviving funds only for the
1989-2003 sample period. Funds are divided into four groups on a yearly basis according to
(i) whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median and (ii) whether RAR is
above (‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a null hypothesis
that each cell should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample. Based on the
results in the last two columns we report a ‘‘T’’ if significant tournament behaviour occurs
for that period and an ‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These are












Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
(4,7) 3,615 24.18 25.64 25.64 24.54 2.395 0.122
(5,6) S 26.14 23.71 23.71 26.45 9.670 0.002
(6,5) 24.20 25.64 25.64 24.51 2.394 0.122
(7,4) 25.15 24.70 24.70 25.45 0.511 0.475
(8,3) S 25.75 24.09 24.09 26.06 4.745 0.029
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the
assessment period is stated as (M,1 1  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 11 M is the rest of the year. All data are constructed using 422 funds for the
1989-2003 sample period. Funds are divided into four groups on a yearly basis according to (i)
whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median and (ii) whether RAR is above
(‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a null hypothesis that each cell
should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample. Based on the results in the last
two columns, we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament behaviour occurs for that period and an
‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These are reported in column 1
Table V.
Sub-samples





Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
Panel A: 1989-1996
(4,8) T 1,476 21.75 27.98 27.98 22.29 20.998 0.000
(5,7) T 22.97 26.90 26.90 23.24 8.500 0.004
(6,6) T 22.70 27.17 27.17 22.97 11.102 0.001
(7,5) T 23.17 26.69 26.69 23.44 6.777 0.009
(8,4) 23.98 25.88 25.88 24.25 1.833 0.176
Panel B: 1997-2003
(4,8) S 2,141 25.97 23.87 23.87 26.30 4.393 0.036
(5,7) S 27.74 21.77 21.77 28.72 35.792 0.000
(6,6) 24.71 24.80 24.80 25.69 0.132 0.717
(7,5) S 25.83 23.68 23.68 26.81 5.943 0.015
(8,4) S 26.48 23.03 23.03 27.46 13.310 0.000
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the
assessment period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 12 M is the rest of the year. All data are constructed using 422 funds for the
1989-1996 (Panel A) and 1997-2003 (Panel B) sample period. Funds are divided into four groups
on a yearly basis according to (i) whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median
and (ii) whether RAR is above (‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a
null hypothesis that each cell should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample.
Based on the results in the last two columns, we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament behaviour
occurs for that period and an ‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These
are reported in column 1MF
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This kind of behaviour might increase fund volatility that has nothing to do with our
investigation. To be conservative, we therefore alternatively perform our analysis on a
dataset that excludes all December returns, in line with Brown et al. (1996). The results
of this are presented in Table IV.
Our previous conclusions remain valid. Maygives significant evidence for strategic
behaviour. The only difference is that also August reports a significant value in favor
of strategic behaviour. Overall however we still cannot confirm the convincing
tournament results reported by Brownet al. (1996) for US funds.
4.4 Sub-sample analysis
All results up to this point have been based on data from 1989 to 2003, a 15-year period
in which we witnessed an enormous growth in the mutual fund sector, as outlined in
section 3. It might be that temporal dynamics influence the findings for the entire 1989-
2003 period. An indication of this can be found in Brown et al. (1996). When they split
their 1980-1991 period into sub-periods it is found that tournament behaviour is only
present during 1986-1991. For the first-half of their sample period, 1980-1985, no
significant results are observed. As the main part of our database is post, the Brown
et al. (1996) sample period it allows us to examine whether their findings persist after
1991.
Table VI.
Small funds using sub-
periods





Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
Panel A: 1989-1996
(4,8) T 579 20.38 29.19 29.19 21.24 16.267 0.000
(5,7) T 22.28 27.29 27.29 23.14 4.860 0.027
(6,6) T 21.93 27.63 27.63 22.80 6.437 0.011
(7,5) T 21.42 28.15 28.15 22.28 9.216 0.002
(8,4) T 22.11 27.46 27.46 22.97 5.621 0.018
Panel B: 1997-2003
(4,8) S 1,019 26.69 23.06 23.06 27.18 6.121 0.013
(5,7) S 27.77 21.98 21.98 28.26 14.842 0.000
(6,6) 24.93 24.83 24.83 25.42 0.048 0.827
(7,5) S 26.89 22.87 22.87 27.38 7.424 0.006
(8,4) S 27.18 22.57 22.57 27.67 9.614 0.002
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the
assessment period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 12 M is the rest of the year. For this test, funds are divided into small (Table
VI) and large (Table VII) based on the median size. For both small and large we then create two
sub-samples, 1989-1996 (Panel A) and 1997-2003 (Panel B). Funds are further divided into four
groups on a yearly basis according to (i) whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the
median and (ii) whether RAR is above (‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is
based on a null hypothesis that each cell should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the
sample. Based on the results in the last two columns we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament
behaviour occurs for that period and an ‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given
period. These are reported in column 1UK mutual fund
industry
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To investigate the temporal dynamics of the tournament we split our sample into two
sub-periods, 1989-1996 and 1997-2003. The year 1996 is not only the middle of our
sample period,but also the year inwhich the Brownet al. (1996)studywas published.
The results using sub-periods are presented in Table V, panels A (1989-1996) and B
(1997-2003). Splitting the sample reveals an interesting pattern. During the first sub-
period, 1989-1996, four out of five months produce significant support for tournament
behaviour. In contrast to that, during the second sub-period, 1997-2003, four out offive
months show significant support for strategic behaviour. A possible explanation for
the strategic behaviour may relate to the impact the Brown et al. (1996) study had on
how managers perceive the fund tournament. After it has been documented that losers
gamble by increasing risk, winner managers anticipate on this and increase risk as
well. This leads to the strategic behaviour as described in Taylor (2003). Therefore
using a UK dataset we can confirm the tournament behaviour described by Brown et al.
(1996) up till 1996 and we provide empirical support for the Taylor (2003) theoretical
modelwhichpredictsstrategicbehaviourafter1996[5].
The shift in behaviour after 1996 is also documented by Kempf and Ruenzi (2005) in
their analysis of tournaments within mutual fund families. Using US data, significant
evidence of tournament behaviour is found during 1993-1996, while during 1997-2003
significant strategic behaviouris observed.
Table VII.
Large funds using sub-
periods





Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
Panel A: 1989-1996
(4,8) 580 22.59 26.90 26.90 23.62 3.348 0.067
(5,7) 22.76 26.72 26.72 23.79 2.768 0.096
(6,6) T 22.07 27.41 27.41 23.10 5.420 0.020
(7,5) 23.28 26.21 26.21 24.31 1.358 0.244
(8,4) 24.66 24.83 24.83 25.69 0.027 0.870
Panel B: 1997-2003
(4,8) 1,019 25.91 23.95 23.95 26.20 1.814 0.178
(5,7) S 27.77 21.98 21.98 28.26 14.842 0.000
(6,6) 24.93 24.83 24.83 25.42 0.048 0.827
(7,5) S 26.89 22.87 22.87 27.38 7.424 0.006
(8,4) S 27.18 22.57 22.57 27.67 9.614 0.002
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year. In column 1, the
assessment period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 12 M is the rest of the year. For this test funds are divided into small (Table VI)
and large (Table VII) based on the median size. For both small and large we then create two sub-
samples, 1989-1996 (Panel A) and 1997-2003 (Panel B). Funds are further divided into four groups
on a yearly basis according to (i) whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median
and (ii) whether RAR is above (‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a
null hypothesis that each cell should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample.
Based on the results in the last two columns we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament behaviour
occurs for that period and an ‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These
are reported in column 1MF
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4.5 Small vs large funds
Based on results put forward in Brown et al. (1996) and Goriaev et al. (2002) we expect
smaller funds to have more incentives and flexibility to change portfolio risk compared
to larger funds. In order to test this hypothesis on our UK funds we rank all mutual
funds by size. We then create two separate samples of funds by using the median size
as cut-off point. Note that from this point on we only report results for using the two
before-mentioned sub-samples, 1989-1996 and 1997-2003. All full sample results are
available upon request with the authors.
In Tables VI and VII we present our results for small and large funds separately. In
line with our previous analysis using the total sample we find strong evidence for
tournament behaviour during 1989-1996 and strategic behaviour during 1997-2003.
Although this holds for both small and large funds, the results are much stronger for
small funds. For instance, during 1989-1996 all five assessment months provide highly
significant proofof tournament behaviour.
4.6 Final month April
The final robustness check we perform relates to the choice of December as the final
month. For US studies this seems an obvious choice, as the US tax year-ends 31
December. In the UK, however the tax year for individuals ends 5 April. Therefore, it
might be the case that UK investors use April as the final evaluation month.
Subsequently fund managers anticipate on this and perceive April as the end of the
tournament. We re-arrange our sample and use April as the final month. The
Table VIII.
April as final month
using sub-periods





Low RTN (‘‘losers’’) High RTN (‘‘winners’’)
‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR ‘‘Low’’ RAR ‘‘High’’ RAR  
2 p-value
Panel A: 1989-1996
(4,8) 1,500 24.47 25.40 25.40 24.73 0.384 0.535
(5,7) S 26.33 23.53 23.53 26.60 5.161 0.023
(6,6) 24.00 25.87 25.87 24.27 1.803 0.179
(7,5) 23.60 26.27 26.27 23.87 3.852 0.050
(8,4) 25.87 24.00 25.87 26.13 2.399 0.121
Panel B: 1997-2003
(4,8) S 1,746 26.17 23.77 23.77 27.29 4.236 0.040
(5,7) S 28.52 21.31 21.31 28.87 38.119 0.000
(6,6) 24.74 25.09 25.09 25.09 0.021 0.885
(7,5) S 26.80 23.02 23.02 27.15 10.904 0.001
(8,4) 24.17 25.66 25.66 24.51 1.213 0.271
Notes: In this table, we report cell frequencies for a 2 2 classification scheme involving the
RAR and compounded return through the first M months of the year ending in April. In column
1, the assessment period is stated as (M,1 2  M), where M indicates the month of the interim
assessment and 12 M is the rest of the year. The analysis is estimated during two sub-samples;
1989-1996 (Panel A) and 1997-2003 (Panel B). Funds are divided into four groups on a yearly
basis according to (i) whether RTN is below (‘‘loser’’) or above (‘‘winner’’) the median and (ii)
whether RAR is above (‘‘high’’) or below (‘‘low’’) the median. The  
2 statistic is based on a null
hypothesis that each cell should receive an equal distribution (25 per cent) of the sample. Based
on the results in the last two columns we report a ‘‘T ’’ if significant tournament behaviour occurs
for that period and an ‘‘S’’ for significant strategic behaviour for that given period. These are
reported in column 1UK mutual fund
industry
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tournament therefore is considered to run from May to April (instead of January to
December). The results of this are presented in Table VIII. Using April as the final
month does not proof to be important. Although we finds some months which support
strategic behaviour the pattern is not very convincing. Therefore, we believe UK
investors as well as fund managers perceive December to be the last month of the
tournament. In addition to that, all popular UK fund resources, including the
authoritativeFinancial Times UK Unit Trust Yearbook, report returns and rankings as
perend of December.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence on the risk-taking behaviour of fund managers in
response to their relative performance. US evidence, presented in Brown et al. (1996),
documents that funds with poor interim performance increase risk to close the gap
with well performing funds. This so-called tournament behaviour is caused by the
asymmetric flow of new money into funds as presented in Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
Goetzmann and Peles(1997)andSirri and Tufano (1998).
Our paper is the first to consider a UK mutual fund database, which enables us to
examine whether the US results are sample specific. Next to that we consider a more
recent time-period and take into account recent criticism on previous studies on
tournament behaviour.
From our analysis of 422 UK mutual funds during 1989-2003, we extract two main
conclusions. First, using the entire 1989-2003 sample period no consistent evidence for
tournament behaviourhas been found. This is robust to the effects of survivorship bias
and window dressing. Second, splitting the sample period into two sub-periods reveals
an important pattern. During the first part of our sample, 1989-1996, significant
evidence for tournament behaviour is found. During the second part of our sample
period, 1997-2003, significant support for strategic behaviour, as described
theoretically by Taylor (2003), has been documented. These results suggest that after
the Brown et al. (1996) study was published, managers entered into a strategic game
that takes the actions of competing managers into account instead of seeing them as
exogenous benchmarks.
Notes
1. In a recent working paper, Makarov (2005) documents similar results.
2. An exception is Hallahan and Faff (2005) who examine Australian Superannuation
funds.
3. For an idea of general studies on UK mutual fund performance see for instance Blake
and Timmerman (1998), Fletcher and Forbes (2002), Otten and Bams (2002) and Ward
and Saunders (1976).
4. According to Brown et al. (1996) July would be obvious cut-off month as managers
revise their investment strategy within the month following the release of the second-
quarter performance rankings.
5. These results are robust to survivorship bias and window dressing effects described
before. Tables are available upon request with the authors.
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